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LIFE INSURANCE-SUICIDE AND EXECUTION
FOR CRIME
In the )ecember number of the Y.ALM, L.w JOURNAL,) I find a
very interesting discussion, involving an important question which
has evoked a variety of judicial opinion in this country and in
E-ngland. The question may be thus stated: What effect is pro-
duced upon the policy of life insurance by the suicide of the in-
sured, or by his legal execution, in those cases wherc the policy
has been taken out in good faith, and where suicide and execution
are not expressly named in the policy as exceptions to the in-
surer's liability?
I agree with the YALE LAW JOUR.NAL that suicide and execution
for murder, in this connection, may conveniently be put upon the
same plane, and also that, in pursuing our investigation, we must
take into account two different kinds of policies. Of these, the
one class includes cases where the insured, who has taken out the
policy and who pays the premiums, is also designated in the policy
as beneficiary. The payee clause of such a policy usually states
that the insurance money is payable to the insured, "his executors,
administrators or assigns". This kind of insurance is the prop-
erty of the insured, subject to claims of his creditors, subject to
his own power of disposal except as limited by law or by the con-
tract itself, and, if undisposed of by the insured, the proceeds of
the insurance, upon his death, become a part of his estate as truly
as any other kind of property which he may own at the time of
his decease.-
The other class includes those many cases where, as beneficiary
in the policy, appears the designation of some third person or per-
sons, usually wife or children or both, and where, either by rule
of law or by provision of the contract, this appointment of bene-
ficiary, so far as the insured is concerned, is final and irrevocable.
Here we have a very different situation from that presented in
connection with the policies first described. Here, though he
may be entitled to retain possession of the instrument, the policy
cannot fairly be said to belong to the insured. Its valid contin-
vance, indeed, may depend upon the continued payment of pre-
22 YALE LAW JO.1tX.\L. pp. 158-162. citing the author's treatise on
I nsurance.-Ed.
2 Central Nat. Bank T. Iunic (1888). 128 U. S., 195. 9 Sup. Ct. 41. 32
L. )-d.. 370.
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miums by him and upon the continued observance oil his part of
certain express witrranties, or conditions, prescribed in the policy,
but all the beneficial interest in the contract, ol the side qf the
instired, has been transferred finally and forever, either gratui-
tously or for a valuable consideration, to Aiaother or to others.
The policy is no longer subject to claims of future creditors of the
insured, nor subject to his power of disposal. Upon his death
it will constitute no part of his estate. His executors or admin-
istrators will hiave no authority to inventory it, nor will they be
able to c0llect its proceeds. In short, to employ. the usual phrase-
ology applicable to such a policy, the rights of the third party
beneficiary are said to be "vested" from the very moment of the
issuance qf the policy.:,
With full consent of the insurance company, the contract of
insurance, from its very inception, is, in a sense, a contract made
between the company and the beneficiary i the insured, in a meas-
tire, is a stranger to the contract, and if, at any time, the bene-
ficiary wilfully causes the death of the insured, the beneficiary
wjll forfeit all his right under the policy.
4
VWith respect to our first named class of policies, many Courts,
il apcordatice with the cardinal doctrine that insurance is a con-
tract of highest good faith, maintain that, though the policy be
silent on the subject, the interest of the insured must be held for-
feited, if it appear that, either intentionally or by felonious act,
he has hastened the event insured against, to wit, his own death.-
" Cntral .Vat. Bank -,. Ifuine (1888), 128 U. S., 195, 9 Sup. Ct. 41, 32
L. Ed. 370; Pin grey v. Vat. Life Ins. Co. (1887). 144 Mass.. 374. 11 N. E.,
562; Shipman v. Protected Home Circle (1903). 174 X. Y., 398, 407, 67
N. H. 83, 63 L. R. A.. 347: in which the Court says, "'his rights when once
thus vested cannot he defeated by the suhsequent acts of the assured."
, New York liut. Life Ins. Co. v. A-rmstrong (1886). 117 U. S., 591,
6 nup. Ct. 881, -29 L. Ed.. 997: Supreme Lodge -.. llenkllaus,'u (1904), 209
Ill., 277, 70 N. E.. 567, 65 L. R. A., 508, 101 Am. St. R., 239: Schmidt v.
Life Assn. (1900). 112 Iowa. 41. 83 N. W.. 800S. 51 L. R. A., 141, 84 Am.
St. R., 321: FihpoF v. Met. Life Ins. Co. (1910, 82 Ohio St., 208, 92 N.
H., 26: Cleq'er i,. Reserve Life .lssn. (1892). 1 Q. B.. 147.
:'Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. .lIciue (1911), 223 U. S., 234; Burt
v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1902), 187 U. S., 362. 23 Sup. Ct., 139, 47
L. Ed., 216; Ritter v. M ut. Life Ins. Co. (1898). 169 U. S.. 139, 18 Sup. Ct.,
300, 42 L. Ed., 693: Supreme Commandery s,. Ainsworth (1882). 71 Ala.,
436, 46 Am. Rep., 332; Shipman v. Protected Homne Circle (1903), 174
N. Y., 398, 67 N. E., 83. 63 L. R. A., 347; Amicable Soc. -,. Bolland (1830),
4 Bligh (N. R.), 194. 2 Dow. & Clark, 1; and many others. Some Courts
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A considerable number of the State Cpurts, however, have
adopted the opposite view, and have concluded that, so far as the
irsigrance company is concerned, it ought to pay in all suchg cses,
bec-ause, witbout specifying any s4ch exception as suicide or Pxe-
cttion for crime, it has expressly agreed to pay upon the occtr-
rpnce of '"egtl' ' and that, so far as public welfare is congerned,
therp is no adequa.t@ reason for disregarding the terlh1 pf the
contrntc or for depriving innocent persons of the ejmoymenl of
thae 1i wan e mloley as stipulated, and no more paus@ for inferring
forfeitqr@ of insurance, thanl for requiiring attainder, or forfeitqre
of other property belonging to the insured at the aate of his sujidi
or legal execution.
0
With respect to the otller clas of policies, those jt! which the
in~srance is made payPe to q third party bepeficiqry by irrev-
opcable appointmerlt, we find @xpressions in several cases, which
would indicate that the salmpe rule pf forfeit ure lp!ust be applied,
gs in case of the first ;.ss of policies, and that a third party benpeZ
ficiary, also; can recoyer nothinlg. The pla sibie argtinent here
is that, if the protection of the policy does not in!clude wilful su-
icide, or deatl for crinme, it ciannot be construed to crqyr for ucl !
a death in favor of any beneficiary Whagtsoever, who .rjfjkes claij!
j!ndr the pqol9y -T
hold that the saipp result follows if the appointment of a third party bepe-
figiary is revoca lp; foq expinple, Davi§ v. $1!prerne Council (1907), 195
Mass,, 40.2, 81 N. U.., ?94.
0 jollinT v. Afetropolitfn Iife Ins. 1 p. (1908), 22 Ill., 37; 1gobsqlp v.
Uizited Prder (104), 93 Minn., 24, 100 N. IV- 381; Iange v. Royal tigh-
!pzder§ (1907), 7. Neb:, 188, 110 N. W., 1110; Campbell v. .gprpjqq Con-
elove (1001), 06 N. J, L., 274, 49 Atl., 590, 54 L, R. A., 570'.0vhih con-
tains ppr Adrpirablp review of authorities. anc discqssion of piblie polip.
t.ys g Avisopuri Cort; "Felf destrp!ction jlwjys indicates, if not ip pity
at least 1p irrespoq.nible state of mind, amio may well be copsidered ppt: of
the risk as§pmed if ot specially excludpd," Marol v. ,$!Premp Fpifqci
(1903), 100 Mo. App., 76, 86. Apd, in enced apparently by th@ sqmp con-
Yjtrion, the Upited States Stpreme Coutrt o ice made the following pon'-
mpent reqprqin& a Pgmsylvipia decision, '*tlp doctrine of ,oqrrq4,qilp v.
-limter was adopted with the confessedly p!nsound qddition tbat §4ipizde
wopi]d avoid a polic y athough there were p condition to that effect in the
poliqy", Ijzsuraic;e (7o. V. Terry (1872), 15 Wall, 580, 586. SO als *Mr.
Qooke says, "If perfqrliance by an insurer is, in general terms, conditioned
op the death of the insured, there seems no valid reason why death by com-
mitting suicide should not be included, and such is the general doctrine",
Cooke Life Ins., Sec. 41.
7 Mit. Life Ins. Co. v. Kelly (1902), 114 Fed., 268, 275. Thus the
United States Supreme Court says, "It cannot be that one of the risks coy-
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But it is of importance to take note that, in no one of these
-cases in the highest court, were the claims of third party bene-
ficiaries involved. There was no adequate presentation of au-
thorities, and presumably no argument addressed to the Court,
in support of the superior rights of innocent appointees. In every
instance the insurance was payable to the estate of the insured,
and to plaintiffs whose rights were measured by those of the in-
sured. Thus in the Federal case last cited, the Court expressly
states, "The question before us, and the only question is: what
rights did McCue's estate and children get by this policy", and
accordingly, in distinguishing from the Wisconsin case, whicb
was decided in favor of third party beneficiaries," the Court says,
"McCue's policy was in favor of his estate, and comes within the
concession made by the Supreme Court (of Wisconsin) to the
reasoning of the Ritter case."
In the often cited case of Fauntleroy,9 decided by the House
of Lords in 1830, the Lord Chancellor, referring to death at the
hands of public justice, says, "it is not within the risk of the
policy". Nevertheless, with this and other cases before them,
the Queen's Bench found no difficulty in granting judgment in
favor of a wife, although the insured, her husband, had inten-
tionally killed himself when sane.'
Indeed when we come to marshal the many authorities, both
cases and text-books, which are directly in point, we find a re-
ered by a contract of insurance is the crime of the insured. There is an
implied obligation on his part to do nothing to wrongfully accelerate the
maturity of the policy", Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S., 362,
365. And again, "It must be held that the death of the assured, if directly
and intentionally caused by himself, when in sound mind, was not a risk
intended to be covered, or which could legally have been covered by the
policies in suit", Ritter v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1897), 169 U. S., 139, 160.
And again very recently the same court, after quoting from the Burt and
Ritter cases, says, "These cases must be accepted as expressing the views
of this Court as to the public policy which must determine the validity of
insurance policies, and which they cannot transcend even by explicit
declarations, much less be held to transcend by omission or implication",
Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. McCue (1911), 223 U. S., 234, 246.
S Patterson v. Nat. Premium Ins. Co., 100 Wis., 118.
0 Amicable Ins. Soc. v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N. R.), 174.
1OMoore v. Woolsey (1854), 24 Eng. L. & Eq., 248. The wife was a
beneficiary for value, having paid premiums, but if a policy does not
"cover" the risk, an assignee for value, no more than a gratuitous assignee
can make successful claim.
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markable unanimity of opinion in favor of third party bencficia-
ries, especially if the appointment is irrevocable."
Says the Pennsylvania Court:
"We are clearly of the opinion that the weight of authority is
to the effect that, where the policy is silent as to suicide, it will not
for such act be avoided as against the wife of deceased, who is
the nominated beneficiary."' 1
Says the Supreme Court of Iowa:
"W'e wish now to add a few words on principle by way of em-
phasis of a thought already expressed. It is not the wrongdoer
who makes claim here, nor any representative whose rights are to
be measured by those of the wrongdoer, but persons who ac-
quired an interest at the time the policy was taken out, and who are
not in any way responsible for the loss under it."'"
The modern text writers, all or substantially all, seem to fol-
low the cases just presented, and to announce as established law
the doctrine for which they stand.'
4
This striking consensus of authority, as it seems to me. is fur-
ther reinforced by the weight of reason. It would appear that
11 Fitch v. Am. Popular Life Ins. Co.. (1875), 59 N. Y.. 557. 17 Am.
Rep., 372. Since then, at least twice and without dissent, the same Court
has reaffirmed the rule, Darrow v. Family Fund, 116 N. Y., 537. 22 N. F.,
1093, 6 L. R. A., 495, 15 Am. St. Rep.. 430; Shipman v. Home Circle (1903),
174 N. Y.. 398, 67 N. E., 83, 63 L. R. A.. 347. To the same effect, Supreme
Council v. Pels (1903), 110 111. App., 409: Supreme Lodqe v. Kutscher
(1897), 72 IlI. App., 463; Parker v. Des Moines Life Assn.. (1899), 108
Iowa, 117, 78 N. W., 826; Mooney v. Ancient Order (1903), 114 Ky., 950,
72 S. W.. 288: Supreme Conclave v. Miles (1901), 92 Md., 613. 48 Atl..
845, 84 Am. St. R., 528; Robson T,. United Order (1904), 93 'Minn.. 24,
100 N. W., 381; Kerr v. Minn.illt. Ben. Assn. (1888), 39 Minn., 174, 39
N. W., 312, 12 Am. St. R., 631 : Mills v. Rebstock (1882), 29 Minn., 380,
13 N. W., 162; Patterson v. Natural Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1898). 100 Wis., 118,
75 N. W., 980, 42 L. R. A.. 253. 69 Am. St. R.. 899; and many other cases
hereinbefore cited. The only case that I have been able to find holding
contra is in a lower Court, Hopkins v. Northwesternt Life !ns. Co. (1899).
94 Fed., 729, affirmed on another ground. 99 Fed.. 202.
2 -Morris v. Life Assur. Co. (1898). 183 Pa. St., 563, 39 Atl.. 52.
1: Seiler v. Economic L. Ass,,. (1898), 105 Iowa, 87. 74 N. W., 941, 43
L. R. A., 537.
14 Cooley's Briefs (1905), "the settled rule", 1). 3226: Vance (1904).
"the clear weight of authority", pp. 516. 517; 3 Joyce (1897). -a general
rule", Sec. 2653; Elliott (1902). Sec. 369: 1 May (1900). Sec. 324: Bacon
Ben. Soc. & Ins. (1904), Sec. 337; Cooke Life Ins. (1891). Sec. 41: McGil-
livray Ins. (London. 1912). pp. 174, 175; Bunyon Life Ins. (London. 1904),
pp. 106, 108.
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much of the confusion attaching to this subject has resulted from
use of the misleading phrase, "the policy does not cover suicide
or crime." Such a statement is not altogether accurate. If we
refer to the unambiguous import of the description, the language
of the policies, which we are considering, does cover, since all
deaths are covered save those specifically excepted, and in many
policies there is the additional statement that the policy constitutes
the entire contract. The issue might better be defined in these
words, "has the particular claimant a right to recover under the
policy ?" Not only, then, by the terms of the contract has the
company agreed to pay, but the company so understands the sit-
nation, and by advertisements and oral representations, the coun-
try over, constantly points to the liberality of its form of policy.
which it describes as substantially incontestable, and thereby at-
tracts to itself immense custom. The insured, if you please, has
been won over by such representations. For a long term of years
his whole family have felt the pinch and stress involved in keep-
ing up the insurance. In a very real sense, wife and children
have contribtfted to the payment of premiums. They are not
only owners for value, but are wholly free of offense. The vest-
ing of their title to the insurance fund antedates the wrongful
act perpetrated by another. Why should the Court, as against
them, impose a forfeiture, which the contract itself does not de-
mand, and thus deprive them of their means of support, and pos-
sibly force them into the poorhouse? Unless compelled by some
urgent consideration of public policy, the Court cannot create
an implied condition which is at variance with the express terms
of a contract. What then is the imperative consideration of
public policy, that is to work such apparent hardship, laying such
a grievous penalty on the innocent, and bringing such extraor-
dinary and unexpected profit to the insurers? Is it that otherwise
the insured may be encouraged to commit suicide and crime?
That same argument may be urged against the universally ac-
cepted laws of inheritance. And as to crime, is not the argu-
ment too far-fetched to be taken seriously? -Might we not about
as well contend that it is against public policy to encourage in-
surers to secure the unjust conviction of innocent suspects? Does
anyone suppose that the wrongdoer committed crime with an in-
tent to hasten his own death? Did he not fight for his life in
the criminal court, to the limit of his means and ability ? Ile did
not kill himself, nor had he any thought of his insurance when he
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was drawn into sin. The State killed him. Why should the
State consider the continuance of his life as a thing so valuable,
and the welfare of his suffering family as a thing to be held so
cheap?
The important institution in this country, known as "life insur-
.ance", is, in some respects, akin to a huge charitable fund, estab-
lished mainly for the benefit of unfortunate wives and children.
Suppose such an eleemosynary institution has been founded by
private charity and for such a worthy purpose. M-lust the Courts
adjudge the foundation void, so far as it opens its doors to the
innocent and needy wives and children of those who have com-
mitted suicide, or who have died in the electric chair? Such a
ruling would be brutal and unchristian in the extreme. Our
thought instinctively revolts against it. But life insurance is not
a pure charity. To the life insurance fund, very often, wives
and children have made -large contribution in money, toil and
sacrifice. Their title to the fund became vested prior to the
commission, of the crime. What difference should it make,
whether the insured was killed by his own act, or by the act of
some stranger or by accident?
It must not be forgotten, in this connection, that policies of life
insurance are often utilized in the market as a means of procur-
ing loans of money. If the rights of an assignee for value are
likely to be cut off by events over which he has no control, the
commercial value of the instrument will be seriously impaired.
The age is progressive. Courts are striving to get into close
touch with the life and needs of the common people. This in-
teresting issue as to third party beneficiaries, with vested rights,
has never been passed upon by the United States Supreme Court,
and when, in the future, that high Court of Justice shall have
occasion to decide it, I venture to express a doubt as to whether
the dictum of Mr. Justice Hunt in the Terry case may not be pre-
ferred to the dictum of Mr. Justice McKenna in the recent case
of McCue.
George Richards.
New York City.
